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 Disequilibrium Econometrics
 on Micro Data
 M. B. BOUISSOU
 J. J. LAFFONT
 Universite des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse
 and
 Q. H. VUONG
 California Institute of Technology
 This paper brings some empirical evidence to the construction of a more disaggregated view
 of disequilibrium. Individual data on firms collected by INSEE through periodic Business Surveys
 are used to construct the distribution of firms over the four possible disequilibrium regimes. Then
 the behavior of this distribution over time is analyzed by estimating dynamic conditional logit
 models on panel data.
 The breakthrough paper on disequilibrium econometrics (Fair and Jaffee (1972)) is now
 more than ten years old. Quandt (1982) has recently surveyed the development of the
 econometric methods dealing with the particular non-linear models generated by fix-price
 models. Laffont (1983) has summarized and discussed the main estimation results of
 macro-disequilibrium models. Though these empirical results are interesting, they suffer
 from an excessive aggregation which prevents a sufficiently precise discussion of the
 nature of unemployment (classical unemployment vs. Keynesian unemployment) and of
 the appropriate corrective economic policies.
 The purpose of this paper is to bring some empirical evidence to the construction
 of a more disaggregated view of disequilibrium by using individual data on firms collected
 by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) through
 periodic Business Survey Tests.' A great potential of this more disaggregated approach
 is the ability to study the relative shares of classical and Keynesian unemployment. For
 policy purposes it is also important to explain why a given sector is in one type of
 unemployment or the other.
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the data and describes how
 the indicator of the regime in which a firm is can be constructed from the firm's answers
 to the INSEE surveys. The resulting distribution on the sample of firms over the four
 possible disequilibrium regimes is then discussed. Section 2 presents some general remarks
 on the estimation of conditional logit models on panel data as well as on the general
 form of the models that we propose to estimate. Section 3 studies the dynamics of the
 regime distribution by introducing the explanatory variables suggested by micro-disequili-
 brium models (see Muellbauer (1978), Malinvaud (1981), Kooiman (1982)). Section 4
 concludes the paper.
 1. DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES
 This section presents the data that are used in our empirical analysis.
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 114 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
 la. Individual data
 Our micro data has been collected by INSEE from about 4000 firms through periodic
 Business Survey Tests.2 These Survey Tests were taken three times a year (in June,
 November, and March) from June 74 to June 78, and four times a year (in June, October,
 January, and March) from June 78 to June 82. Only firms with a single major product
 are retained in the sample. Each firm was also classified according to the nature of its
 product into one of the following five sectors:
 1. Agricultural and Food Industries,
 2. Intermediate Goods,
 3. Professional Equipment,
 4. Automobile, Transportation,
 5. Consumption Goods.
 From the firm's answers to these surveys, two qualitative variables were constructed:
 (i) an indicator of surprise with respect to the demand received by the firm for its product,3
 and (ii) an indicator of the regime experienced by the firm during the period.
 The demand surprise indicator, denoted MSD, is constructed from the answers to
 the following questions appearing in each survey:
 "Indicate the probable change in demand for your product until the next survey:
 increasing, stable, decreasing."
 "Indicate the change in demand for your product since the last survey: increasing,
 stable, decreasing."
 From two successive surveys, we can readily define the variable MSD as:
 MSD= 1 if the firm has over-evaluated its demand,
 MSD = 2 if the firm has correctly evaluated its demand,
 MSD = 3 if the firm has under-evaluated its demand.4
 Let us now turn to the construction of the regime indicator IR. In the spirit of
 micro-disequilibrium models we are reasoning as if each firm has its local product market
 and its local labour market. Let IQ and IL be respectively the indicators of the states
 of the goods market and of the labour market, where:
 IL = 1 if excess supply of labour,
 IL = 2 if excess demand for labour,
 IQ= 1 if excess supply of good,
 IQ = 2 if excess demand for good.
 Information on the indicators IQ and IL can be obtained from the INSEE surveys
 since in these surveys firms are asked questions about their perceived constraints on their
 product and labour markets. Specifically, the indicator IQ is obtained from the answer
 to the question:
 "If you received more orders could you produce more with your actual means?"
 If the firm answers YES we presume, following Malinvaud's remark (1980, p. 73), that
 the firm is constrained on its good market (IQ = 1), while if the firm answers NO we
 presume that the firm is not constrained on its good market (IQ = 2). Similarly, the
 indicator IL is obtained from the answer to the question:
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 "Do you now have difficulties in recruiting?"
 If the firm answers YES, we presume that it is constrained on its labour market (IL = 2),
 while if the firm answers NO we presume that it is not constrained on its labour market
 (IL= 1).
 There are obviously some problems with the interpretation to give to these answers;
 however, various alternative ways of using the answers to the INSEE surveys do not
 change the qualitative features of the empirical results presented in Section 3.5
 Provided that a firm's answers to both of these questions are available it is possible
 to classify that firm in one of four possible disequilibrium regimes. Specifically,
 IR = 1 (Keynesian Unemployment) if IQ = 1 and IL= 1,
 IR = 2 (Under Consumption) if IQ = 1 and IL= 2,
 IR = 3 (Classical Unemployment) if IQ = 2 and IL= 1,
 IR = 4 (Repressed Inflation) if IQ = 2 and IL = 2.
 According to this definition of the regime indicator we obtain Table I, which presents
 for the whole sample the distribution of the firms over the four possible disequilibrium
 regimes. These results can be compared with the ex post probabilities of the different
 regimes obtained by Artus, Laroque, and Michel (1984). One major feature of their
 TABLE I
 All five sectors
 Keynesian Under Classical Repressed
 unemployment consumption unemployment inflation
 Date Sample (%) (%) (%) (%)
 75 03 1741 67-03 15-51 11-77 5-69
 75 06 1818 69-70 15-51 9-79 5-00
 75 11 1869 68-27 14-87 11-40 5-46
 76 03 1842 62-81 18-24 11-67 7-28
 76 06 1787 51-82 22-50 13-43 12-25
 76 11 1829 55-28 20-78 13-72 10-22
 77 03 1923 57-88 18-82 14-30 9 00
 77 06 1917 58-53 18-62 14-45 8-40
 77 11 2119 60-97 18-12 13-07 7-84
 78 03 2013 62-49 18-33 12-57 6-61
 78 06 2031 59-87 18-07 14-33 7-73
 78 10 1785 60-62 17-54 14-73 7-11
 79 01 2036 60-95 16-85 15-28 6-92
 79 03 1988 60-82 15-79 16-35 7 04
 79 06 1965 56-69 15-98 18-73 8-60
 79 10 1996 54-61 16-33 20-14 8-92
 80 01 1919 56-70 16-21 18-86 8-23
 80 03 2031 54-01 16-45 20-38 9-16
 80 06 1957 56-11 16-09 18-65 9-15
 80 10 2015 63-23 16-63 14-14 6-00
 8101 1804 69-01 14-63 12-42 3-94
 8103 1726 71-55 12-57 12-34 3-54
 8106 1671 73-55 11 19 11-85 3-41
 8110 1774 70-97 12-63 12-91 3-49
 82 01 1832 70-69 11-68 13-37 4-26
 82 03 1743 69-31 13-42 12-79 4-48
 82 06 1648 63-96 15-53 14-93 5-58
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 116 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
 results is obtained here: namely, the predominance of the Keynesian unemployment
 regime.6
 It would be interesting to comment in detail on Table I in the light of the French
 experience over the period 1975-1982. We shall only mention two important attempts
 that were made during this period to decrease unemployment with usual Keynesian
 policies: the Chirac experiment from June 1975 to June 1976 and the Mauroy experiment
 from June 1981 to June 1982. Both share the same features: a strong decline in the
 proportion of firms in the Keynesian unemployment regime with an increase in all other
 regimes. The Mauroy experiment appears less effective with a stronger relative increase
 in the proportion of firms in the classical unemployment regime. This is not surprising
 given that in the Mauroy experiment the low real wages have been increased substantially.
 Note also the dynamics after the Chirac experiment. The proportion of firms in the
 Keynesian unemployment regime increases again, but the proportion of firms in the
 classical unemployment regime continues to increase. Finally, the substantial increase
 in Keynesian unemployment from June 1980 to January 1981 seems to be due to the
 second oil crisis.
 The same classification was carried out for each sector of the economy. In particular
 we found that the intermediate goods sector and professional equipment sector are the
 slowest to react; the automobile and transportation sector reacts quite strongly and
 rapidly; the consumption good sector reacts quickly but not as strongly.
 lb. Macro data
 Some macroeconomic variables are used as additional explanatory variables (see Muell-
 bauer (1978), Malinvaud (1981), and Kooiman (1982)). All the macroeconomic variables
 were dichotomized and constructed from appropriate series obtained from the Comptes
 Nationaux Trimestriels published by INSEE for the period under study. If IX denotes
 the dichotomous variable associated with the latent continuous variable X, then the
 dichotomization rule is:
 IX =1 if X is above a trend,
 IX = 2 if X is below a trend,
 where the trend is obtained by adjusting a line on the time series X.
 Two sectoral indicators and two national indicators were constructed in this way.
 These are:
 IGS: indicator of sectoral public expenditures,
 IGT: indicator of total public expenditures,
 ISB: indicator of the sectoral real cost of labour as measured by real
 gross wages, which include employer and employee social security
 payments and the like,
 ISN: indicator of purchasing power as measured by real take-home pay,
 which includes personal income taxes for the whole economy.7
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 In addition, lags of these indicators are also used as explanatory variables.
 Specifically, if IX is an indicator, then
 IX1 is the indicator lagged 3 months,
 IX2 is the indicator lagged 6 months,
 IX3 is the indicator lagged 9 months.
 2. ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC CONDITIONAL MODELS ON PANEL DATA
 All the models that we estimate are conditional logit models (see e.g. McFadden (1974),
 Nerlove and Press (1973, 1976)) where the endogeneous variable is the disequilibrium
 regime indicator IR. As a matter of fact, we consider a special case of the conditional
 logit model since all our explanatory variables are qualitative.
 All our models are dynamic in the sense that they all include the 3 months lagged
 regime indicator IR1 as an explanatory variable. Thus we can think of the remaining
 explanatory variables as explaining the 3 months transition probability from one regime
 to another. Our models are therefore of the form:
 IRIIRl, IA, IB,...
 where IA, IB, . . . are explanatory variables to be defined in Section 3. The parameterization
 used is the ANOVA parameterization (see Nerlove and Press (1976), Vuong (1982)). As
 usual we restrict the effect of each explanatory variable to its bivariate effect. Specifically,
 let IRit, IAit, IBit,... denote the regime and the explanatory variables for the i-th firm at
 time t respectively. Let KR, KA, KB, . . . denote the number of categories of these variables
 where, in our case, KR is equal to 4, KA and KB are equal to either two or three. Then
 we have:
 log Pr (IRit = k IIR 1 t IAit IBit, . . A. + ak +11kllIlt
 KA
 +Yai 3k,aDa(IAit)
 +EK-13k,bDb(IBit)+ (l
 where D (IXit) is equal to one if IXit = x, and zero otherwise, the parameters a and ,3
 satisfy the ANOVA constraints:
 KR
 k-1 ak 0,
 Ek=R Bkx EKx1 13k,x =0, Vx, Vk, (2)
 and ,u is a normalizing parameter depending only on the a 's and 13's so that, given IR lit,
 IAi,, IBit,..., the conditional probabilities in (1) add up to one.8
 Conditional logit models have been in general estimated on cross-section data only.
 The reason is that estimation of such models relies on the usual assumption that the
 observations are mutually independent, an assumption that is hardly justified in time
 series or panel data. Since we are ultimately interested in the effects of macro indicators
 such as IGT that therefore do not vary across individuals, it is necessary to use panel
 data in order to identify these macro effects. In this section we justify our estimation
 procedure on theoretical grounds. As a matter of fact, our justification is valid for the
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 estimation of any dynamic conditional model on panel data when macro explanatory
 variables are possibly present.
 Suppose that one has available a complete panel data on T equally spaced periods
 (t= 1, .. ., T) for n individuals (i= 1, ..., n). Let Yi, be the endogenous random vari-
 able(s) observed at time t for the ith individual. Let Xi, and Z, be vectors of explanatory
 variables where Xi, vary across individuals while Zt do not. For instance, Xi, may be
 IR1 or MSD, while Zt may be IGT or IGS.
 Let Y', be the set of variables { Yis, YiS+1,..., YiJ where s -t. We make the
 following assumptions:
 Assumption A.1 (Markov Specification). For any i= 1, ..., n, and any t=
 h+1l,...,I T:
 Pr(Y tIYt-,1 Xt, Ztoo) = Pr (Yj YitYh, Xit-h, Zt-h)
 where Pr (AIB) is the conditional density of the variables in A given the variables in B,
 and h is the maximum lag specified. It is assumed that h < T.
 Given the choice of a family (in general parametric) of conditional distributions,
 Assumption A.1 is nothing else than the specification of a Markovian structure of
 order h.
 Assumption A.2 (stability). (a) For any i = 1, .. ., n, and any t, s in {h + 1,..., T}:
 Pr (Y Ylt h, Xt-h, Zt-h)= Pr (YiI Yisl Y hs-h, Zsh),
 (b) For any i, j in {1, ... ., n}, and any t = h + 1, .. ., T:
 Pr (Yit YI1 h, Xft-h, Zt-h) = Pr (Yjtl Yt 1h, Xt-h, Zt h)-
 Assumptions A2(a) and A2(b) respectively require that the conditional model of
 interest be stable across time and across individuals. Clearly some stability assumptions,
 which may not be as strong, are needed in order to estimate a model.
 The next assumption deals with the sampling of individuals.
 Assumption A.3 (Sampling). The n stochastic vector processes {( Yit, Xit); t = -oo, T}
 for i = 1, .. ., n are mutually independent given the stochastic process {Zt; t = -oc, T},
 i.e. for any i:
 ( Yi_00 Xioo){( J _00, XJ,_00); j 0 i}|ZTX
 where AIBIC denotes that A and B are conditionally independent given C.
 For instance, if there are no macro variables Zt, then Assumption A.3 simply means
 that the sampling of individuals is random.
 Assumption A.4 (Exogeneity). For any i=1,..., n, and any t=1, .. ., T:
 X+?Z+?? ytt+ I tl t0
 If there are no macro variables Zt, then Assumption A.4 simply requires that Yit does
 not Granger cause Xi, or equivalently that Xit is strictly exogeneous to Yit (see Chamber-
 lain (1982), Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1985)).
 Assumptions A.1 to A.4 can be considered as the standard assumptions underlying
 the estimation of a dynamic conditional model on panel data.9 It is worth noting that
 we obtain as a special case (h = 0, T = 1) the assumptions that are implicit in the estimation
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 of a conditional model on a cross section, and as another special case (n = I) the
 assumptions that justify the estimation of a conditional model on time series.
 We now consider the likelihood function associated with the observations on the
 panel { Yit, Xit, Zt; i = 1, . . ., n, t = 1, . . ., T}. Since h may not be null, we shall in fact
 consider the conditional likelihood function Lyxz given all the variables prior to period
 h+l, i.e.
 Lyxz = Pr [(( YThl XiThl); i = 1, ... , n), Zh+11(( Y Xv); i-1,..., n), Z_0,]-
 We have:
 Lyxz = Lylxz x Lxz
 with
 Lylxz = Pr [(YTh+l; i-1,..., n)|(( Yh_O, XT i); i = 1,..., n), Z_OO] (3)
 Lxz= Pr [(Xih+l; i 1,*.., n), Zh+?1(( _ Xi ); i = 1,..*, n), Z_o] (4)
 Since Lyxz is the (conditional) likelihood for (((YTh+l, XTh+l); i =1,..., n), ZT+1)
 and since Lxz is the (conditional) likelihood for ((XTh?l; i= 1,..., n), ZT?D, it follows
 that Lylxz as defined in (3) is the conditional likelihood for (YTh?l; i = I,..., n) given
 ((XT h+l; i = 1,..*, n), ZT+1).
 We have:
 T
 Lylxz = fl Pr [(Yfit; i = 11 .. I n)|I(( Y'i _10, Xl;_) i =1 ..., In), Z_0O
 t=h+l
 n T
 n T~ ~ ~~~~Z
 - H H Pr [YitJ Yjt,-j XT,-oo); Z ., n,, ZI0
 i=1 t=h+l
 n T
 = H H Pr [YJ Y~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2X~~~~~0, X1, Z2O
 rTn flPr Iylyt I-l XT zT 1
 i=1 t=h+l
 n T
 -l fl rLlitly-,i i-(i,-(:O9-00J
 i=l t=h+i
 where the first equation is an identity, the second and third equations follow from
 Assumption A.3, and the fourth equation from Assumption A.4. Moreover, it follows
 from Assumption A.1 that:
 n T
 Lyz -= H H Pr [ Yit Yt 7h, Xt t-h, Zt-h]
 i=1 t=h+l
 and from Assumption A.2 that:
 n T
 yx=H H Pr [Y= Y YilhlY=t-h Xh = Xt-h, Z0h=Zt-h] (5)
 i=1 t=h+l
 where yi,, y h,,, XIt-h, zt-h are the observed realizations of the random variables Y,t,
 i,t-h, Xtt-h, Zt-h, and Y, Y', Xo, Z? are the random variables implicitly defined by
 the stability Assumption A.2.
 Each of our conditional logit models is estimated by maximizing a conditional
 likelihood function of the form (5) where the conditional probabilities are defined by
 equation (1) and the parameters are the a's and 18's which satisfy the ANOVA constraints
 (2). From the general properties of conditional maximum likelihood estimation (see
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 Anderssen (1973), Vuong (1983)) it follows that this procedure leads to consistent
 estimates. It is also worth noting from Equation (5) that the conditional likelihood Ly,XZ
 is written as if all the observations were independent where one observation is an
 observation on a firm at a given period. In addition Equation (5) shows that we can pool
 all these n ( T - h) observations.
 3. DISEQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS
 Our purpose is to explain using the variables that were mentioned in Section 1 the
 transition matrix associated with the four possible disequilibrium regimes (see Equation
 (1)). Specifically, we consider the transition probability from one state to another 3
 months later. We have then considered only the dates for which a survey was available
 3 months earlier. These dates are 7506, 7606, 7706, 7806, 7901, 7906, 8001, 8006, 8101,
 8106, 8201, and 8206 (see Section 1). The number of observations in each sector, where
 an observation corresponds to a firm for a given date, is:
 Sector 1: 1241 observations,
 Sector 2: 4885 observations,
 Sector 3: 2302 observations,
 Sector 4: 449 observations,
 Sector 5: 5293 observations.
 The transition matrix for the whole industry has the form:
 KU UC CU RI
 p(l/ 1) p(1/2) p(1/3) p(1/4)1 KU
 p(2/1) p(2/2) p(2/3) p(2/4) UC
 p(3/1) p(3/2) p(3/3) p(3/4) CU
 p(4/1) p(4/2) p(4/3) p(4/4) RI
 where p (j/ k) denotes the transition probability from state k to state i. From the observa-
 tions pooled over the 12 periods that were singled out above we can obtain the following
 observed three-month transition matrix for the whole industry with probabilities given
 as percentages:
 85-82 24-69 24.31 12.13
 7 00 64-24 2-74 18-53
 5.73 2-32 65-45 14-51
 1-45 8-74 7-51 54.84]
 There is for each regime a high probability of staying in the same regime. Moreover,
 the Keynesian unemployment regime appears to be an absorbing state. Similar characteris-
 tics are obtained when transition probabilities are computed for each sector. These
 qualitative features must, however, be treated with care since the transition probabilities
 are influenced by some macroeconomic variables that were not invariant over the period
 under study.
 Table II presents a first set of estimation results that were obtained by using only
 the lagged regime indicator IR1 and the individual demand surprise indicator MSD.10
 These results should be read as follows. When the upper tail probability (UTP) is
 larger than 5% it means that the current model cannot be rejected against the correspond-
 ing unconstrained (or saturated) model by a log-likelihood ratio test at the 5% significance
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 level.11 The number below an explanatory variable is the UTP in % of the chi-square
 Wald statistic that is used to test that the variable is significant. If this number is less
 than 5 it means that the suppression of the effect is rejected at the 5% significance level.12
 When an explanatory variable other than IR1 is significant at the 5% level we give for
 the first category of that variable (IX = 1) the signs of the effects on the four disequilibrium
 regimes.'3 For instance, (+, + -, 0) means that an over evaluation in demand (MSD = 1)
 relatively increases the probabilities of being in regimes 1 and 2, decreases the probability
 of being in regime 3, and has no significant effect on the probability of being in regime
 4 ceteris paribus.
 TABLE II
 Model IR/IR1, MSD
 IR IR 1 MSD UTP
 Secto
 1 0% 18% 10-70%
 (+,0,o,0)
 2 0% 0% 5-53%
 3 0% 0% 87-80%
 4 0% 44.8% 29-80%
 (0,0,0,0)
 5 0% 0% 24-00%
 As expected from the observed transition matrices given above, we find that the
 lagged regime indicator IR 1 is strongly significant for every sector. We also observe that
 the demand surprise indicator is strongly significant for sectors 2, 3, and 5, while it is
 not for sectors 1 and 4. Sector 1 (Agricultural and Food Industries) always gave poor
 results and we shall abstain from giving any explanation. On the other hand, the
 non-significance of the demand surprise indicator in sector 4 (Automobile and Transporta-
 tion) is probably due to the predominance of production to orders in this sector. Finally,
 when the demand surprise indicator is significant it has the "correct" signs. By "correct"
 signs we mean that when a firm has over-evaluated its future demand, this increases its
 probability of being in the excess supply (of good) regimes (IR = 1, IR = 2) and decreases
 its probability of being in the excess demand (of good) regimes (IR = 3, IR = 4).
 For our second set of results, we introduce the macroeconomic variables that are
 suggested by the disequilibrium microeconomic literature and described in Section 1. We
 only give the main results for each sector.
 SECTOR 2
 Intermediate goods
 IR IR1 MSD IGS ISB UTP=6-43%
 0% 0% 81% 0%
 (+,+,-,-) (-,o,o,+)
 IR IR1 MSD IGS IGS1 IGS2 IGS3 UTP= 5-45%
 0% 0% 57% 0% 0% 10%
 (+,+,-,-) (+,0,0,-) (-,o,0,+)
 IR IR1 MSD IGT IGT1 IGT2 IGT3 UTP=21 20%
 0% 0% 25% 5-46% 1-31% 15%
 (+,+-,-) A(0,-,0,0) (-,0,+,0)
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Wed, 20 Sep 2017 23:27:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 122 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
 In this sector a stimulus on total public expenditures has after 6 months (IGT2) the
 expected effect of decreasing the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment
 regime. Sectoral public expenditures do not have, however, a clear effect. A possible
 explanation is the following: In the short run public expenditures have no effect (IGS);
 since public expenditures are increased during Keynesian unemployment periods, we
 observe an unexpected negative effect (IGS1); finally an effect in the expected direction
 emerges after 6 months (IGS2). The sectoral cost of labour indicator (ISB) has significant
 effects and behaves as an indicator of purchasing power since a stimulus leads to a
 decrease in the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime and to a
 simultaneous increase in the probability of being in the repressed inflation regime. This
 latter remark actually holds for all sectors.
 SECTOR 3
 Professional equipment
 IR IR1 MSD IGS3 ISB UTP = 92-7%
 0% 0% 14% 0%
 (+,+,-,-) (-,o,o,+)
 IR IR1 MSD IGS1 IGS2 IGS3 ISB UTP = 76-8%
 0% 0% 25% 10% 3.79% 0%
 (+,+,-,-) (-,0,0,0) (-,0,0,+)
 When sectoral public expenditures have significant effects (in general after 9 months:
 IGS3) they have the expected signs since a stimulus on public expenditures decreases
 the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime.
 SECTOR 4
 Automobile and transportation
 IR IR1 IGS1 IGT2 ISN UTP = 39-3%
 0% 0-72% 0% 0%
 (-,0,0,0) (-,0,0,0) (-,0,0,0)
 IR IR1 IGS1 IGT2 ISB ISB1 ISN UTP = 35-7%
 0% 4-97% 0 51% 0 94% 6-5% 0.05%
 (0,0,0,-) (-,0,0,0) (-,0,0,+) (-,0,0,0)
 Sectoral and total public expenditures (IGS and IGT) are often significant with the
 correct signs. The indicator of purchasing power ISN plays the expected role since a
 stimulus on ISN decreases the probability of being in the Keynesian unemployment
 regime.
 SECTOR 5
 Consumption goods
 IR1 IR1 MSD IGT3 ISN UTP= 17%
 0% 0% 0*03% 0%
 (+, +,-,-) (-,-, 0, +) (-, O, ,+)
 IR1 IR1 MSD IGS2 IGS3 IGT2 IGT3 UTP = 27-6%
 0% 0% 0% 004% 39% 1-87%
 (+,+,-,-) (-,0,-,+) (+,0,+,-) (-,-,0,0)
 IR IR1 MSD IGS1 IGS2 IGS3 ISB UTP=56 7%
 0% 0% 10% 2-31% 0% 48%
 (+, +,-, -) (0, O, O, +) (+, O,0, -)
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 In this sector total public expenditures after 9 months (IGT3) and sectoral public
 expenditures after 6 months (IGS2) have significant effects with the correct signs. Sectoral
 public expenditures after 9 months (IGS3) have significant effects but with the incorrect
 signs. The indicator of purchasing power ISN is strongly significant with the expected
 signs, while the sectoral real cost of labor indicator ISB is not significant.
 5. CONCLUSION
 This preliminary study has yielded the following results. First, the stability of the results
 with respect to the various sectors is striking. In all sectors we found that demand surprises
 are very significant in explaining the disequilibrium regimes with always the expected
 signs. The fact that an increase in public expenditures tends to decrease the probability
 of being in the Keynesian unemployment regime was clearly shown with a lag of 6 to
 9 months. This result does not have, however, the stability of the previous ones. Our
 difficulties in obtaining clear estimated effects of public expenditures may be due to the
 endogeneity of this variable.
 The index of purchasing power when significant has the right sign in the sense that
 an increase in this variable tends to decrease the probability of being in the Keynesian
 unemployment regime. We were, however, unable to exhibit the positive impact of an
 increase in the sectoral wage level on the probability of being in the classical unemployment
 regime. When this variable is significant it plays the same role as a purchasing power
 variable.
 Finally, we must note that our analysis is hindered by the predominance of the
 Keynesian unemployment regime. Our inability to find evidence of the effect of sectoral
 real wages on the probability of being in the classical unemployment regime may be due
 to this characteristic of our sample.
 First version received January 1984; final version accepted July 1985 (Eds.)
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 NOTES
 1. The possibility of using such surveys for analyzing disequilibria was also suggested by Malinvaud
 (1981) and Kooiman (1982).
 2. For more details on these surveys, see e.g. Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1984).
 3. The role of this variable has been emphasized in a macro-disequilibrium framework by Green and
 Laffont (1981) and in a microeconomic model by Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1984).
 4. The same variable was used by Konig, Nerlove, and Oudiz (1981).
 5. Two more complex methods of constructing the indicators IQ and IL from the INSEE surveys were
 tried. For more details, see Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1984).
 6. The other result obtained by these authors is a great jump in Keynesian unemployment at the end of
 74, i.e. just following the first oil crisis. Though this second result cannot be observed with the present method
 of constructing IR due to missing data, it can however be observed with the second method of constructing
 IR that was studied in Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1984).
 7. For more details on how these indicators as well as their latent continuous variables were constructed
 from the series available in the Comptes Nationaux Trimestriels, see Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1984).
 8. Alternatively, using the ANOVA constraints (2), it follows that ,u=
 (1/KR) EkR log Pr (IRi, = kl IR1 i, IAi,, IBi,, . * .). Thus equation (1) can be thought of as defining the condi-
 tional probabilities in terms of deviations from their log-mean.
 9. Any of these assumptions can actually be tested. For instance, Bouissou, Laffont, and Vuong (1985)
 have derived some readily applicable tests of Assumption A.4 when there are no macro variables Z,.
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 10. All our empirical results were obtained by using the program CALM written by J. P. Link. This
 program estimates conditional ANOVA log-linear probability models (for the theory, see Nerlove and Press
 (1976), Ottenwaelter and Vuong (1981), Vuong (1982), and for a survey Nerlove (1983)).
 11. This test can be thought of as a specification test for the model defined by equation (1). Specifically,
 it tests whether restricting effects to bivariate interactions is supported by the data. For formulas giving the
 appropriate degrees of freedom of the chi-square statistics, see Haberman (1974) and Vuong (1982).
 12. In the tables below, if the upper-tail probability is less than 0-005%, it appears as a zero.
 13. As mentioned in Section 2, the ANOVA parameterization is used. Since IR has 4 categories, it follows
 that the (bivariate) effect of an explanatory variable with J categories is characterized by 4 x J ANOVA
 parameters of which 3 x (J -1) are independent due to the usual ANOVA constraints. Hence, when J =2 it
 suffices to give the signs of the ANOVA parameters associated with the first category of the dichtomous variable.
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